Abortion and Animal Welfare: A Parallel Perspective
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In the following essay, I invite the reader to look at a time-worn topic from an unusual vantage point. We will reach this new vista, ironically enough, by means of a very old philosophical method: the drawing of an analogy. I will take one aspect of the much-debated topic of abortion and compare it to a similar aspect of the now well-established animal welfare movement. If my analogy is compelling enough, I will show that there are solid grounds for ethical agreement among combatants who are likely to debate both issues.

If we forget for a moment the central, highly respectable struggle over *personhood* for the fetus, and look instead at its lesser status as the offspring of the animal species *Homo sapiens*, we find a basis for its comparison with other mammalian animals. While the reader is cautioned to respect all the obvious dissimilarities between human and non-human species, he is reminded that they share nevertheless many *physically sentient* capacities, i.e., capacities for feelings of comfort, pain, etc. With this basis for analogy in mind, I will argue that one's views about abortion ought at least be consistent with legal and societal views on the humane treatment of animals in general. With due regard for the idea of man as master of all earthly creatures, I believe one can easily demonstrate that certain common abortion procedures simply amount to animal cruelty, and that these inhumane practices fundamentally jeopardize the morality of these abortions. We shall have found a *physically direct*, albeit more mundane, way to approach the ethics of this very difficult controversy.

I will also argue that there are specific reasons why some abortion procedures have only recently been recognized as inhumane, why they were not evaluated according to humanitarian guidelines in the first place, and why this did not seem to be necessary. These reasons relate to the privacy and invisibility of the act of abortion, and to our normal reluctance to attend to problems not overtly threatening. Unfortunately, abortion seems to be a way of not facing the actuality of what one is doing. The argument goes roughly like this:

If a human fetus is recognized in its animal being, we can argue that it should not be treated in a manner recognized as inappropriate for any other animal. The human fetus would then be entitled to all the considerations which animal welfare advocates grant to laboratory animals, for example, and all the outrage vented over admittedly inhumane practices would be shared by anti-abortionists as well. Humane treatment for animals may indeed be the umbrella under which some human fetuses will find shelter along with baby seals, sperm whales, laboratory rabbits, etc. If this is the case, we shall have found an important reason why specific kinds of abortion are morally unacceptable.

We must be convinced at the outset that the fetus as a living animal is properly so-called. We have genetic evidence that it definitely is a being separate and distinct from its biological mother, and that natural events will force it to live on its own when gestation is complete. Its spatial location within the womb is thus temporary, and its body make-up is not altered by birth. It is genetically parented by a species which recognizes itself as a member of the animal kingdom. It seems, then, that the developing fetus with a recognizable body possessed of shared features etc., is surely an animal offspring. A young human animal, an animal whose body will develop the fullness of its genetic link with all of us, is without doubt present within the womb.
Fetal research indicates that a central nervous system is developing well before the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, sometime close to the eighth week of gestation. In layman's terms, the young human animal begins to develop the qualities of a physically sentient being. At the eighth week of gestation, the nervous system progresses gradually so that its body becomes more and more able to feel physical sensations, a process which is not complete at birth, but fully accomplished during growth outside the womb. In any case, from the eighth to the fortieth week (the projected delivery date), the fetus tests out as a developmentally sentient being. (There is physical response to stimuli, etc.)

At least two conclusions can be drawn here: 1) that the young human animal beyond the eighth week may feel in ever increasing degrees sensations caused by activity within the womb, and 2) that this continuum of developing sensation is neither halted nor completed by birth, but unaffected by birth, except insofar as the newborn is no longer surrounded by amniotic fluid, nor has its sensations affected by its cramped enclosure. Presumably then, in regard to this second point, what the fetus may feel before it is born is not substantially different from what it may feel immediately after, but different only in degree depending on the time interval in question.

How does this affect our behavior toward fetuses? Does the fact that the fetus may feel sensations bear on how we treat it during an abortion? If we can identify specific actions that we would under no circumstances force an hour-old newborn or a laboratory monkey to undergo, is it permissible to allow a fetus to endure those same actions? If a central nervous system is incomplete yet functioning in both of the human cases, on what grounds can we justify dissimilar treatment? Should the law have jurisdiction over abortion procedures, given its sway over the treatment of animals, forbiddance of their physical abuse, etc.? Do we need new law to address these compassionate worries?

The answers to these questions may be found by examining and seeking parallels in some of the issues which concern animal rights advocates in this country. They claim, for example, that abuse of laboratory animals is a serious problem which continues as a part of scientific research despite laws supposedly to the contrary, such as the Animal Welfare Act as long ago as 1970. A position paper published by United Action for Animals, Inc., states,

The fiction that veterinary husbandry (herd management, good housekeeping) alleviates laboratory animal suffering is a myth that was imported into this country from Britain in the early 1950's, although it had been the fashion there since 1926. So deeply did the scheme take root in this country that American humanitarians worked for and achieved passage of the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, which is based almost entirely on veterinary animal husbandry. But stories of laboratory atrocities continued to pour out during the 1970's--AFTER passage of the Act. Clearly, veterinary husbandry wasn't working, nor was the Act's provision for pain-relieving drugs, which was shouted from the housetops, so to speak, by the humanitarians who promoted the Act into law. 2

These people point out that tests like the LD50--the lethal dose of a drug or chemical that must kill 50% of the animals involved in the test--forced hundreds of thousands of small animals to die a very painful death. No pain-relieving drugs accompany the test, and United Action for Animals claimed that veterinarians in the laboratory would have us believe that the animals won't mind a hideous death at all, if only they have cage-mates to keep them company before they're used. 3

Similarly, the Society for Animal Rights, Inc., attacked the cosmetics industry for abusing animals during tests for toxicity. It cited continued use of the Draize test for eye irritancy, in which rabbits are used "because they have no tear ducts which, as in humans, would cause tears to wash the substance from the eyes. Rabbits' corneas are far more sensitive than humans'. The rabbits are restrained in stocks . . . The substance to be tested is placed in one eye of each rabbit." 4 The test likewise used no anaesthesia and recorded hideous results. The cosmetics industry also used the LD50 tests to determine lethal quantities of its products and the above source cites that animals' "organs are ruptured when cosmetics are pumped in by stomach tube" "if the animals refuse to swallow the material." 5 The Society in general opposed all "suffering inflicted on unconsenting animals" and urged people to lodge protests directly to the cosmetics industry. United Action for
Animals, Inc., also urged legislative action, claiming "that these animals no longer need to die. Scientists at two institutions can now predict the biological effect of most chemicals from their physical/chemical structure." It is claimed that this modernization of laboratory research procedures is very much opposed by the American Association for Laboratory Animal Science, "which also speaks for laboratory animal breeders and dealers who profit handsomely from the huge number of small animals used in the LD50's." Perpetuating animal suffering for profit is a grisly thought indeed. In any event, the animal rights advocates mounted an impressive case against, I repeat, "suffering inflicted on unconsenting animals." The cosmetics industry, under intense public pressure, has since tried to eliminate animal testing whenever possible, and carefully labels its products accordingly.

Getting back to abortion procedures, can we argue against certain of them on grounds parallel to those against painful research involving laboratory animals? It is true that young human animals are mammals awaiting birth while laboratory animals involved in research are already born. Nor are we comparing experimental research on human subjects with research on lower animals. The common denominator I wish to focus upon is rather animal suffering or the experience of physical discomfort or pain. It seems to me that the fetus's as-yet-unborn location within the womb does not jeopardize valid comparison with small animals in the laboratory, since it has been determined that the fetus's physically sentient capabilities begin to develop long before birth. Both the fetus and the laboratory animal may feel physical sensations and thus share a quality basic enough for comparison. The varying degrees to which fetal animals and older animal subjects may feel pain are recognized, but the degree of pain should not matter in an argument establishing that the pain itself, in any amount, is needless, capable of being alleviated, or forced upon the subject in question.

Most of us are verbally familiar with some of the abortion procedures commonly used in hospitals and women's clinics in this country. Terms like 'saline' abortion, 'suction' abortion, or more recently, >intact D&E< abortion, are recognizable to the layman, and are used in much the same way as other medical terminology, viz., to refer to operations and procedures in a way that identifies what has been done to oneself, will be done to others, etc. When the layman uses terms in this way, he need not understand the details of the medical procedure referred to, or specifically why the operation makes the patient 'better.' For example, I refer to the fact that a female acquaintance has had a mastectomy. I know that this term is used to refer to removal of a breast, but I do not know how the surgery actually proceeds or what the surgeon has to do in order to accomplish the breast removal. Other examples of medical procedures that laymen commonly refer to without very specific knowledge of what they entail are 'coronary by-pass,' 'hysterectomy,' and so on. We remain ignorant of the specifics because we don't need to know about them to benefit from their effects on us and those around us. In many cases, the specifics would shock us, in part because we lack medical training, but mostly because those unaccustomed to the visual routines of surgery find them bloody, repulsive, or even downright grisly. We much prefer ignorance of such things for the sake of a settled stomach, and because we can witness ourselves or any other patient progressing and recovering without knowledge of what has transpired beneath the surgeon=s knife. And so we have the same attitude toward surgical abortion procedures—they are operations about which we know or want to know very little. They accomplish their purpose without our perusal, in the privacy of an operating room, and we observe only the woman who has undergone the procedure, in the same way that we observe others who are just out of surgery. Because we tend to measure the seriousness of the surgery by how quickly the patient is up and around, we conclude that the abortion procedure is a minor one indeed, since we see the woman walk out of the operating facility within a few hours of her entrance. And so the great majority of us know little or nothing about the actual procedures beyond referring to them by their proper terms.

What we fail to realize is that we do not really observe the result of an abortion when we watch the former mother depart the hospital or clinic. An abortion is hidden behind the privacy of the act and the invisibility, to a great extent, of what actually happens within the uterus. The fetus is the
actual subject of the surgery, and it is the latter's unseen effects which make an even further point of
comparison between laboratory animals and the unborn human offspring. Most of the time, just as we
do not see what happens to the fetus, we do not see what happens to the laboratory animal. We hear
only of the results: the product or experiment has been successfully tested or the abortion has been
successfully performed. If we begin to compare what actually happens to the laboratory animals in
the tests described above with what actually happens to the fetus, we can see that abortion
procedures may be just as objectionable. We may even be inclined to say that they are more
objectionable because most of us view the human species with a higher regard than we view rabbits,
for example, or laboratory mice, monkeys, etc. And if it does turn out that the fate of the fetus as at
least a partially sentient animal is more physically drastic than that of procedures on laboratory
animals, we will find ourselves in the surprising position of requiring unborn human animals to
undergo what we do not even consider necessary or ethically appropriate for laboratory animal
testing. This would be an amazing discovery indeed, and one that would shock most of us who have
little medical expertise in this subject. We would then have to acknowledge that our treatment of
unborn human animals is less humane than treatment of rabbits, rats and mice, when we would
ordinarily hope it was the other way around.

The 'bottom line,' so to speak, will be the extent to which the fetus is physically harmed during
an abortion. No humanitarian assessment of the procedures can avoid this aspect of the matter,
notwithstanding the aversion we may have for grisly accounts that certain physicians and anti-
abortion forces indeed provide us. Prof. John T. Noonan, Jr., in his 1979 book *A Private Choice*,
provides a detailed quotation of these medical procedures and then seeks to translate them to
laymen's terms. Without reproducing his extensive descriptions, I will provide a brief summary with
limited quotation from the text.

The first method is the "D and C," medical shorthand for 'dilation and curettage,' in which a
woman's cervix is enlarged or dilated to allow entry of an instrument called a curette, for the purpose
of scraping the inside of the uterus of its fetoplacental content. The curette is either a sharp, knifelike
instrument, or a hollow tube with a curette inside, adapted for a suction procedure. When the former
is used, Noonan translates: "A curettage, then, is a form of cutting. If improperly used, the knife will
cut the mother. Properly used, the knife will cut the unborn child." The suction curettage, on the other
hand, involves the addition of a 'vacuuming' type removal. The suction curette is attached to tubing
which carries out the contents of the uterus. Noonan quotes a medical text: "Bloody fluid and bits of
pink tissue will be seen flowing through the plastic tubing during the entire suction curettage." Translates Noonan: "The fetal parts referred to are the dismembered portions of the body of the
unborn child, who has been cut up and vacuumed.'

Noonan refers here to 'the unborn child' as synonymous with 'fetus.' While I quite
agree with Noonan's word choice, we have been here discussing the fetus in its animal nature only,
and so, we can substitute the choice of 'young human animal' for 'unborn child.' We would refer then
to "the dismembered portions of the body of the young human animal which has been cut up and
vacuumed." In either case, however, the actuality is hideous. We might wonder here whether
laboratory research on small animals actually ever calls for the dismemberment of the subject, but
one assumes that the hue and cry surrounding such an occurrence would be loud indeed.

The second procedure Noonan discusses is the saline abortion, or 'intra amniotic
instillation.' This has been used in second trimester abortions and "water with a salt solution is
injected by catheter into the amniotic fluid which surrounds the unborn child." There is expert
opinion that a solution of 20% sodium chloride is a chemical poison, as confirmed by Noonan's
source, Selig Neubardt and Harold Schulman, *Techniques of Abortion.* These doctors claim, "If by
accident it is injected subcutaneously, intraperitoneally, or intramyometrially, it produces exquisite
and severe pain . . . Intra-amniotic hypertonic saline probably exercises its effect by chemically
stopping fetal and placental function and thereby initiating labor." One hears of 'salt-induced osmotic
shock' to the fetus once the salt solution has been absorbed by osmosis through his skin. *Taber's*
Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary refers to shock as the "Term used to designate a clinical syndrome with varying degrees of disturbances of oxygen supply to the tissues and return of blood to the heart." For these reasons, the fetus sometimes goes into convulsions. It is also claimed that the thin and extremely tender fetal skin tissues are severely burned by the caustic salt injected in solution (whence the term candy-apple = baby). At any rate, the following contains Noonan's conclusions:

In laymen's language, the fetus is poisoned, dies within two hours, and is expelled. Does the fetus feel the "exquisite and severe pain" which the childbearing woman may feel if an accident occurs? When the body of the child is expelled, it will be "acid-soaked." Given that the saline method of abortion is typically used in the second trimester, it is not unlikely that the individual subjected to it is developed enough to feel pain. Although the appreciation of sensation will not be that of a developed nervous system, it may be inferred that what is exquisite and severe for the childbearing woman will also have painful consequences for the child.

If it can take as long as two hours for the fetus to expire after a saline injection, one shudders at the possibility of a slow, convulsive death, regardless of the degree of pain involved. The caustic burning of the fetus's skin as the subject is trapped in the womb surrounded by the fatal solution reminds us of the rabbit undergoing the Draize test, immobilized in a stock and unable to force the toxic substance being tested away from its eye. Under these conditions the fates of the two subjects, the fetus and the rabbit, seem somewhat similar.

A further similarity between the lab animal and the fetus may reside in examination of moral agent intent and result. Just as the lethal dose toxicity test intends animal death, the abortion procedure intends fetal demise. In order for either procedure to claim success, action to bring about the intended death of the subject is central to the operation. And suppose either procedure fails? We are left with a live animal that is not to be salvaged. The lab animal, once physically compromised, has its remaining life discarded. While American law allows active euthanasia for the lab animal, such is of course not the case for the fetus, and the human animal=s fate becomes ironic tragedy. Noonan comments: "The death of the unborn child is caused by exposure to an environment he or she is not developed enough to function in. Death by exposure was a Greek and Roman way of killing infants. The method is here applied to the delivered child." What happens as the result of this exposure? He continues: ". . . The child at birth must not be given the ordinary medical treatment of a preterm infant. If not given aid, he or she will choke to death, suffocate, or freeze."

Americans are lately concerned with evaluating, both morally and legally, a more recent surgical procedure known as intact D&E, or intact dilation and evacuation. This partial birth event involves dilating the cervix and drawing the fetus feet first out of the womb. Since the head is too large for the opening, the physician must collapse the skull. The base of the fetus skull is therefore pierced with an instrument and the brain suctioned out until the evacuation is achievable.

Some physicians have argued that considerable nationwide outrage in this matter is misplaced, since intact D&E is meant to replace dismemberment D&E, a more violent procedure that involves serious risk of piercing the mother=s organs with shards of fetal bone.

But which procedure is more violent seems to me a misconceived question. Whether either procedure is at all humane to the fetus is more seriously at stake, especially since not all practitioners cut the umbilical cord in advance to make sure the fetus is dead. With a live fetus of 20 weeks or later, either procedure is horrifying indeed. Anesthesiologists have testified that the mother=s sedation or anesthesia has little effect on the fetus, especially since the procedure is not too long.

Having studied briefly the above methods of abortion, I conclude that little attention seems given to humanitarian concern for the fetus. Is this tolerable in a society where medical science has advanced far enough to accomplish near miraculous results? If animal welfare advocates can argue that modern laboratory techniques do not need experimentation on live animals and thus do not need to inflict unnecessary pain, can't we advance the parallel argument that if modern medicine can decide how to abort painlessly, then it must do so to comply with a societal and legal philosophy against cruelty to animals? Logical consistency dictates that these violent procedures should either
be outlawed or drastically altered because of their inhumane treatment of the young human animal. It may be objected that the whole issue of needless' pain inflicted on small animals is a bogus one, since research on laboratory subjects certainly is not cruelty for the sake of cruelty, but rather suffering that is necessary for a better purpose. One might argue that if small laboratory animals do not undergo experimentation, human persons will go unwarned about toxic substances and suffer serious consequences. And so the experimental suffering serves a useful and valuable purpose.

Similarly, it may be argued that the suffering of the fetus also serves a useful and valuable purpose, namely that of relieving its mother of the burdens of pregnancy and a child she does not desire. And so the fetus's suffering must be tolerated for the sake of a greater good.

These parallel objections are groundless, however, if the facts show that animal suffering in both cases is unnecessary. Advocates of the Research Modernization Act, as mentioned above, assert that animal reactions to drugs are often chemically predictable due to advances in chemical knowledge of substances and their make-up. So animal suffering is not required to obtain successful toxicity results. In the case of abortion, removal of the fetus and fetal suffering are not entailed, one with the other. If the medical profession were required to develop further methods of abortion free from fetal pain concern before any more abortions could be performed, period, one can imagine that public pressure would force quick results. And so fetal suffering seems just as needless and cruel as much of the suffering endured in research laboratories.

We also find that the pain behavior of the fetus also matches the pain behavior of other animals. We must remember that an instinctive rather than self-conscious desire not to suffer pain explains an animal's behavior when tormented physically. We instinctively recoil from pain or move to avoid it. This reaction presupposes no rational capability, no thought process, and no prior experiential conditioning. Research has carefully documented the fetus=s instinctive reactions to stimuli while yet encased in the womb. A nine-week fetus has been photographed jerking backwards from a mere stroking of the lip area with a tiny probe. When the palm of the hand is brushed, the fingers close down partially. A ten-week fetus, if touched on the sole of the foot, jerks his leg upwards and away. It is amazing that these reactions can occur in a being weighing no more than an ounce. When we consider that a normal full-term baby weighs between five and nine pounds, it is easier to imagine how much more finely-tuned its sentient capabilities must become, in lieu of the amazingly early reactions it exhibits. If slight brushing or stroking can stimulate such responses in a nine or ten-week fetus, imagine how the fetus reacts when sliced or punctured by the surgical curette during a late first-trimester D and C abortion, or when burned by the salt solution of a second trimester saline abortion. Surely, physically, the fetus ought not to be aborted painfully, regardless of the fact that it is as yet unborn.

Noonan further documents instinctive fetal reaction against pain. He relates the experience of Richard Selzer, a surgeon and medical writer at Yale Medical School. The surgeon had never witnessed an abortion, and decided to observe one performed by injection of prostaglandins (labor-inducing substances) into the amniotic fluid. The fetus was twenty-four weeks' gestation, and the procedure was observed with no intrauterine equipment. As the surgeon stood watching the operating physician insert the needle into the abdomen of the woman, he describes what he saw:

I see something! It is unexpected, utterly unexpected, like a disturbance in the earth, a tumultuous jarring. I see something other than what I expected here. I see a movement—a small one. But I have seen it.
And then I see it again. And now I see that it is the hub of the needle in the woman's belly that has jerked. First to one side. Then to the other side. Once more it wobbles, is tugged, like a fishing line nibbled by a sunfish...
What I saw, I saw as that: a defense, a motion from, an effort away...

With this kind of observable phenomenon, it is difficult indeed to believe that the unborn fetus is an unfeeling, amorphous mass of tissue, incapable of characteristically animal reaction, and hence dispensable and disposable without thought of its physical sensations.
Before concluding, a further comparison is in order. Just as society and our legal system must deal with 'unwanted' pregnancies and 'unwanted' children, they must deal with unwanted animal pets. We have thus established governmentally controlled and administered animal shelters to collect, house, and dispose of stray, unsupervised or unclaimed animals. How do we treat these unwanted animals? How do we proceed before they are disposed of? How does our treatment of unwanted fetuses or pregnancies compare? It has long been the procedure of some animal shelters to establish a protective waiting period before unclaimed animals are disposed of. We already have pointed out the humane qualities of these shelters regarding the methods of putting creatures 'to sleep,' but we have not focused on the philosophy of the waiting period itself. Often several days must pass before an unclaimed animal is put to death so that the shelter can furnish members of the public with a chance to claim it if they so desire. If an individual desires a pet, it is known in advance that some are available for the asking at the shelter. This procedure accomplishes at least two worthwhile objectives: 1) It prevents the irreparable waste of an animal's life if someone comes forward to adopt it; and 2) It provides animal lovers with a marvelous way to obtain the animals they so desire. Now it seems ironic indeed that our society makes this kind of practice available to animal lovers and makes no such service available to child lovers or baby lovers. If we established 'baby shelters' whose business it was to round up all the unwanted babies born to parents who did not desire them, we would at least bring our service to adopting parents up to par with service to adopting pet lovers. One might assert here that these baby shelters already exist in the form of adoption agencies but that is not quite the case. We are now able to eliminate the problem of unwanted babies before it seems to present itself, i.e., by aborting them before anyone else has the chance to claim them. As hideous as the thought of gassing unclaimed babies may seem, I would imagine, given the present difficulty of finding children for adopting parents, that 1) far fewer babies would lose their lives and 2) they would be disposed of under far more humane circumstances, if abortion rights were eliminated in favor of the baby shelter procedure. One may object that it is far easier to give up an unwanted pet than an unwanted child, hence the attraction of abortion. But it is hideous indeed to think that we as a society would rather kill our fetuses violently than see them given as healthy babies to someone who wants them. If I as a pregnant woman choose abortion rather than adoption, I just might be saying that if I can't have this baby, then no other woman can have it either. One is tempted to call this selfishness of an extreme variety indeed. In any case, at the present time, we seem to dispose of unwanted pets in a far more humane and less wasteful manner than we dispose of unwanted human fetuses.

We must keep in mind, however, that the legal situation vis-a-vis abortion is far from resolved. Current law tells us that killing a newborn baby is murder and yet even partial birth >abortion= (or >infanticide=?) is legally defended. Proponents of abortion might then argue that they find themselves legally boxed into their position. We seem to need abortion (in some cases) because infanticide is still murder. Perhaps the reason we do not feel constrained to put our pregnant cats through abortions, for example, is because it is legally permissible to kill the kittens after they're born. The situation is exactly the reverse with humans. If it is the legal prohibition against infanticide which keeps the attending physician from administering a lethal dose to the fetus after it is born alive, then the law here is seemingly inconsistent with itself. The cutting of the curette and dismemberment by suction are direct assaults on the body of the fetus which bring about its death, just like the lethal dose would be. Making one act illegal just because it takes place outside the womb makes spatial location alone the deciding factor between abortion and illegal infanticide. This situation seems logically puzzling: Either abortion and post-partum destruction of the young human animal should together be legal, or together outlawed; consistency alone seems to call forth such pairing.

The point of this entire essay has been to highlight the societal, personal, and legal confusion surrounding the whole matter of the treatment of the young human animal. The reader is carefully reminded that the ethics of abortion involve many more avenues of examination than just the physical sentience of the fetus. It is also critical to note that the above arguments fall far short of the task of deciding the whole controversy one way or another. But we must not fail to note that we are at times
outraged and at times passive; we pick and choose among our activities toward animals in general, here waving the banner of humane treatment and there condoning acts of pain and violence. We must at least strive to equalize and make consistent, both legally and morally, all our actions in this regard. Perhaps it is no surprise that some of the same congressmen who have co-sponsored legislation on behalf of laboratory animals have also co-sponsored various "human life" amendments, or have voted to severely restrict funding for abortion. Is it time for consistency to catch up with chaos?

ENDNOTES
1 The reader is invited to read an article by John T. Noonan, Jr., "The Experience of Pain by the Unborn," in New Perspectives on Human Abortion, eds. Thos. W. Hilgers, M.D., Dennis J Horan, David Mall, University Publications of America, 1981, pp.205-216. Here Noonan gives lengthy facts supportive of the 56th day of gestation as the fetus's sentient threshold.
3 Ibid., p.5.
5 Ibid, p. 2.
6 "The Continuing Battle," see note 2 above, p.5.
7 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p.166.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., pp. 166-67.
12 Ibid., p. 167.
15 A Private Choice, see note 8 above, p.167.
16 Ibid., pp. 167-8.
17 Ibid.
19 Support for this conclusion may also be suggested in Sissela Bok's "Ethical Problems of Abortion," Hastings Center Studies, Jan.1974, Vol.2, No.1, pp. 34-35. Here she draws a distinction between "cessation of bodily life support" and "actively killing the fetus outright." The methods of abortion examined herein of course belong to the latter kind of activity.

21 Ibid., p.73.

22 *A Private Choice*, see note 8 above, pp. 169-170.