Nelson v. Commonwealth
24 Va. App. 823 (1997)
BAKER, Judge.
Amy
Michelle Nelson (appellant) appeals from her bench trial conviction by the
Circuit Court of the City of Newport News (trial court) for possession of
cocaine in violation of Code #18.2-250.
She contends that the cocaine was discovered during an unlawful search
of her person. The sole issue presented
is whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the cocaine evidence
discovered as a result of an anticipated pat-down search of appellant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
In
reviewing a trial court=s denial of a motion to suppress, A(t)he burden is upon (the appellant) to show that this
ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the Commonwealth,
constituted reversible error.@ Fore v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va.1007, 1010, 265 S.E. 2d 729, 731 (1980). We Areview findings of historical fact only for clear
error and ... give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident
judges and local law enforcement officers.@ Ornelas
v. United States, ____ U.S. ____, ____, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L. Ed.
2d 911 (1996). We review de novo
the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. See id.
Viewed
accordingly, the record reveals that at approximately 10:34 p.m., on August 2,
1995, Officers Lee Andrew McGraw and Peter Edgette of the Newport News Police
Department were dispatched to 208 Nina Court to investigate a possibly burglary
in progress at 210 Nina Court. When the
officers arrived at 208 Nina Court, the neighbor told them that she had
observed a black female wearing a black shirt and multi-colored top leaving 210
Nina Court and walking toward Colony Road.
The neighbor explained that she suspected a burglary because the residents
of 210 Nina Court were not at home and she had never before seen this person
leaving the 210 Nina Court address.
Officers
McGraw and Edgette, in separate vehicles, drove toward Colony Road and observed
appellant, a black female, dressed exactly as the neighbor described. Appellant was carrying an eight-inch piece
of a coat hanger which she laid on the curb as the officers approached
her. She was agitated and sweating profusely. In police uniforms, the officers approached
appellant and asked for identification.
She said that she had none.
Appellant told the officers that she was walking toward her home in
Courthouse Green; however, she was not traveling toward the stated
destination. Appellant=s statements became increasingly confusing and inconsistent
as she attempted to explain her actions to the officers.
After
appellant made the confusing and inconsistent statements, the officers decided
to further investigate the burglary complaint.
Intending to place appellant in the police patrol car as they completed
their investigation, Officer McGraw advised appellant to place her hands on the
rear of the patrol car. McGraw intended
to conduct a pat-down search for weapons.
Edgette escorted appellant to the car, where, instead of complying with
McGraw=s direction, appellant moved her right hand to her
waistband and threw the complained of evidence onto the ground. Appellant then
kicked the item across the street. The
officers placed appellant in the car and retrieved the item, which proved to be
a silver metal stem that contained cocaine.
Thereafter,
a white male wearing only underwear shorts approached the scene. The man had a strong odor of alcohol about
him, and Officer Edgette concluded the man was intoxicated. The man had no identification about his
person. He stated that he was the
owner of 210 Nina Court, that no burglary had taken place there, and that
appellant had been playing cards with him.
At
trial, appellant conceded that the officer=s
had a right to Amomentarily detain (her).@ The record
clearly supports their action. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 (.S. 1, 88 S. S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968) ( a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest). Assuming the totality of the circumstances, the record shows that
the officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that appellant
may have been engaged in criminal activity.
See Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 288 S.E. 2d 475, 478
(1982). Once a suspect has been
properly detained, a police officer may conduct a limited pat-down search for
weapons if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect may be armed. Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204,
211, 308 S.E. 2d 106, 111 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104, 104 S.Ct.
1604, 80 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1984).
The
record establishes that the officers were investigating a report that a
burglary had taken place at the address from which appellant had been seen
exiting. Burglary is a felony that
clearly has the potential for or is accompanied by violence. See Wayne R. LeFave, Search and
Seizure, #9.5(a) at 255 (3d ed. 1996).
The offender is subject to a
substantial penitentiary term.
See Code ##18.2-89. 18.2-10. The character of the offense is a circumstance which the
investigating officer may consider when determining what safety precautions to
take. Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 354 S.E. 2d 79, 87
(1987); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 28, 88 S. Ct. At 1883. Where burglary is the crime for which the
suspect is lawfully detained, it is not unreasonable for the investigating
officer to conduct a pat-down search to assure his or her safety as the investigation
continues.
Whether
a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of
the officer=s actions in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting him or her at the time and not on the officer=s actual state of mind at the time the challenged
action was taken. Maryland v. Macon,
472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1985); see
also Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 538, 383 S.E. 2d 476, 480
(1989) (en banc), cert. Denied, 495 U.S. 905, 110 S. Ct. 1925, 109 L.
Ed. 2d 288 (1990). Here, the record
reveals that the police received information that a burglary had been or was
occurring at 210 Nina Court, and that a black female wearing a multi-colored blouse
and black skirt had just departed from the premises. Appellant met the
description given and was found near 210 Nina Court. These factors may be considered in determining whether further
investigation was warranted. See
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed 2d 301 (1990); Boyd
v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 179, 189090, 402 S.E. 2d 914, 920-21
(1991). Clearly, the officers had
reasonable suspicion of appellant=s
possible involvement in a burglary.
Once
an officer has lawfully stopped a suspect, the officer is authorized to take
such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect his or her personal safety
and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop. Servis v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 519, 371 S.E. 2d 156, 162 (1988). We hold that the pat-down search of
appellant was reasonably necessary to protect the officers= safety and to maintain the status quo during the
stop. Therefore, the search was not in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly,
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.